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to the fund represented by either,
and it is upon this reasoning, that
in every other jurisdiction, a deliverv of them is regarded as vesting the donee with an equitable
title which a chancellor would
recognize.
In Walsh's Appeal, the Court
seems to have thought that the
character of the delivery required
was the same as that necessary to
support voluntary assign*ent to
one person in trust for another
(Milrov v. Lord, 4 DeG. F. and J.,

264). There is nothing in common
between the subjects mentioned
-one is conditional and the other
absolute. In donatio morlis causa
there is no intention in the first
instance to pass the property
absolutely; because if the donor recover, the property is to remain in
him, and a complete title might,
therefore, be inconsistent with this
conditional quality.
JOHN A. MCCARTHY.
PHILADELPHIA.

EDITORIAL NOTES.
BY W. D. L.

TREASON AGAINST THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA.
TiE threatened indictment of the leaders of the Home.tead Riot for treason against the State of Pennsylvania
brings the whole question of what treason is before the public. Treason against the State, as defined by its laws, consists in levying " war against the same," or " adhering to
the enemies thereof giving them aid and comfort." ' This
is practically identical with treason against the. United
States, which is said in Article III., Section 3, of the Constitution to "consist only in levying war against them, or
in adhering to their enenies giving them aid and comfort."
We are not concerned with that treason which consists in
giving aid and comfort to enemies of the government. Enemie in the sense inwhich the words are here used denotes
exchl -v;clh the subjects of a foreign power at war with the
IP. D. 400,
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government.' If,therefore, the strikers are guilty of treason, it is because they levied war against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. What is it that the rioters
actually did ? Before the trial it is perhaps a mistake to
speak of the facts, and yet we can assume, if only for the
sake of argument, that they held possession, by force, of
the private property of the company. For a time at least
they kept private property against the will of the lawful
owner and in contravention of the principle of the laws of
the State that every man has a right to the possession of his
own property.
Now robbery in its legal signification may be defined
as the taking of the property of another, by force and
against his will. In its strict legal sense it is confined to
personal property; while the crime of keeping another out
of his real estate by force is called forcible detainer, and in
the State of Pennsylvania renders one liable to a year's imprisonment and a fine of $500'. Still, in its broader and
popular acceptation these strikers robbed the Carnegie company of the use of their works. In the same way, in the
time of war, if an armed force enters the country it also
takes private property in defiance of laws of the land. Yet
we all recognize that there is a distinction between these
acts. As Mr. Justice GRIER most aptly says: "ALEXANDER THE GREAT may be classed with robbers by moralists,
but still the political distinction will remain between war
aid robbery.' ' The robber and the soldier both set the
law of their victims at defiance, but there is this vital distinction between them: one acts for his own private end
without a pretence of right, the other acts primarily for a
public and general purpose, and always with a pretence of
having right and justice on his side. With more or less
clearness, this distinction has always been recognized by the
profession in this country, and, practically, has invariably
1 Opinion of Mr. Justice FiELD in U. S. v. Greathouse, 2 Abb. Ca. Ct.,
372.
2P. D. 407, 28.
8 Op. U. S: v. Hanway, 2 Wall. Jr., op. p. 205.
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been enforced by the courts in every case which has come
before them. A cursory glance at the decisions on this
subject will be sufficient proof of this statement.
The first indictments for treason against the United
States were those found against some of the participators
in what are known as the whisky disturbances of I794. In
1791 and '92 Congress had passed an excise law affecting
-distillers, of whom there were a large number in the westThe Act was very unpopular
ern part of Pennsylvania.'
in that section, until finally discontent broke out into an
armed opposition, which required the whole energy and force
of the newly established Federal Government to suppress.
The nature and character of the opposition is seen from the
preamble of a resolution passed by "A Meeting of Sundry
Inhabitants of the Western Counties of Pennsylvania,'"- in
which it was declared that "a tax on spirituous liquors is
unjust in itself, and oppressive upon the poor; and that
internal taxes upon consumption must, in the end, destroy
Many of those who took part
the liberties of any people."
in the disturbances could not have any direct interest in
the distilleries themselves. The purpose of the inhabitants
of the western counties was plain; they intended to prevent
the enforcement of the law, because they denied to the government the power or right to pass such a law. Judge PATT'ERSON, who presided at the trial, therefore practically condemned the rioters when he said: "If its (the insurrection's)
object was to suppress the excise offices and to prevent the
execution of an Act of Congress, by force and intimidation, the offence in legal estimation is high treason; it is
the zszirya/ion ? M1e azilhority of goz'ernmen,,. it is high
treason by levying war." '
Similar in its main outlines to the case above quoted
is that of the trial of the Northampton Insurgents who had
by force and arns resisted the collection of the Federal tax on
houses and lands.'
Acts of March 3. '791, and May 7,

'Wh. State Trials, p. 107.
Wh. State Trials, p. Ib2.
'Act July 9, 179 8.

1792.
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They were convicted of treason, one Fries being convicted twice.' Judge PETERS in his charge to the jury said:
"It is treason in ' levying war against the United States'
for persons who have none but a common interest with their

fellow citizens, to oppose or prevent, by force, numbers or
intimidation, a public and general law of the United States
with intent to defeat its operation or compel its repeal."
These italicised words indicate the true line of distinction between treason and mere robbery, murder or other
crime. In one case the primary interest must not be for
private gain; it must be an opposition based on principle,
however false and mistaken that principle may be. Thus
the smuggler who, in attempting to land his goods and escape gives battle to the revenue cutter, defies the law, and
enters into armed resistance to authority; but he does not
commit treason, he does not try to annul the revenue Act,
but simply to break the law for his own private gain.
Again, the highway robber breaks the law regarding
private property, but he does not commit treason. As between the government and the individual, he is perfectly
willing that the individual should own property. He simply desires to appropriate another's property for his own
ends, and not for the purpose of annuilling the laws respecting private property. He may combine with others to rob,
murder or steal, but the fact of their combination does not
make their act treason. Combination to break a law is not
itself treason. It depends on the intent with which the
combination was formed.
Thus where a body of men fully armed disregarded the
embargo laid on the exportation of goods to Canada and
captured from the marshall a raft laden with goods, taking
the same into Canada, it was held not to be treason although
the men carried on a regular battle with the troops while
escaping with the raft. 3 Judge LIvINGSTON, in his remarks
to the jury on the trial, said: "If the Court does not
I Wh. State Trials, p. 584.
2

8

Wh. State Trials, p. 456, 61o.
U. S. v. Hoxie, i Paine's Cr. Ct., 26S.
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greatly err, no construction in England, and certainly none
in America, has yet carried this doctrine the length to
which we are expected to go. . . . It is impossible to
suppress the astonishment which is excited at the attempt
which has been made to convince a court and jury of this
high criminal jurisdiction, that between this and levying
war there is no difference." '
The same principle was
recognized and enforced
in the celebrated case of the United
States z. Hanway, ~2 which grew out of the fugitive slave
law. A Marylander, named Gorsuch, desiring to recover a
runaway slave, procured, under the Act, a warrant from the
United States Court in Philadelphia for the arrest of the
slave. Armed with this warrant, and in company with a
deputy marshall, he attempted to arrest his slave in a village
called Christiana, near the town of West Chester, "a place
infested with abolitionists." He found the slave in a house
with many other blacks. Hanway, a white man of avowed
abolitionist sentiments, was on horseback near the house.
The negroes and the marshall's party fired on each other,
the negroes escaped and the slave-owner was killed. On
the ground that he had taken part in this disturbance
Hanv'av was arrested and tried before the late -\r. Justice
GRIER for treason against the United States. That learned
jurist was of the opinion that the acts in question were not
treasonable, even if Hanwav had taken part in them. "'A
number of fugitive slaves may infest a neighborhood and
may resist with force and arms their master or the public
officer who may come to arrest them; they are guilty of
felony and liable to punishment, but not as traitors. Their
ins'llrretioni is jio a
orZ'al/ ant connected wcith/ no
objecl,
fitblic u;nose."
That some of the blacks or Hanway
himself may have believed the fugitive slave law wrong and
desired its repeal, did not make an act whose primary. and
principal intention was the liberation of a particular slave
treasonable. The vast majority of those who participated
1 Op. p. 27o and 373.
2
U. S. v. Hanway, Wall Jr., 139.
- U. S. v HanwaV.

2

Wall J., p. 205.
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combined and fought for the purpose of preventing their
friend from being carried back into slavery, and it could not
be proved that their principal object was to emphasize their
objection to a particular law of Congress or to its power to
pass such a law.
With this statement of the principles by which we
should test acts to determine whether they are treasonable
or not, and the practical illustrations of the few cases which
have occurred, let us return to the Homestead rioters.
Before, under the law, a conviction can be obtained, the
State must prove that a decided majority of those who took
part in the riots did so, not only from a desire to be personally
reinstated in the Carnegie Mills, but from a desire to
emphasize their belief in the principle that a man who
works in an iron foundry has a vested interest in his position, of which the managers cannot deprive him without
the consent of a union composed of iron workers, and from
a desire to emphasize his hatred of those principles of the
law of the State of Pennsylvania which allow the owners
of iron foundries to discharge their workmen and take
others, irrespective of the wishes of the rest of their employees. It will be impossible to tell till the trial whether
the State can prove all this. If not thoroughly proved, let
us hope the jury will take to heart the warning of the
Supreme Court of the United States, "That it is more safe,
as well as more consonant to the principles of our Constitution that the crime of treason should not be extended by
construction to doubtful cases." On the other hand, if it
is clearly proved that this was an armed attempt to change
the laws of the State, let us also hope, for the present dignity and future peace of our Commonwealth, that the jury
will not shrink from their duty to convict. With the wisdom or the justice of the laws as they exist the jury will
have nothing to do. If the people do not like the laws, let
them change them by their ballots, not.by their bayonets.
ADDENDUM.

Since the above was written, the Chief justice of Pennsylvania presiding over a Court of Oyer and Terminer,
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has defined "treason" under the laws of the State. In
speaking of what the State had to show in order to make
the acts of the Homestead Rioters treason, we presumed
that the line dividing treason from other crimes would be
drawn by the courts of the State as it had been in the
Federal Courts, seeing that the statutes of the State defining treason were almost identical with that crime as defined
in the Constitution of the United States. In this, at least
as far as the Chief Judicial Officer of the State is concerned,
we were mistaken. The criterion of treason against the
State, as defined by that learned jurist in his clear and
concise charge to the Grand Jury, is not that the act shall
have been done for a public as distinguished from a private
purpose, but that there should be organized resistance to
the authority of the Slate. He says:

"A mere mob collected upon' the impulse of the
moment, without any definite object beyond the gratification of its sudden passions, does not commit treason,
although it destroys property and attacks human life. But
when a large number of men, ahn and organize themselves
by divisions and companies, appoint officers and engage in
a common purpose to defy the law, to resist its officers and
to deprive any portion of their fellow-citizens of the rights
to which they are entitled under the Constitution and laws,
it is a levying of war against the State, and the offense is
treason; much more so when the functions of the State
Government are usurped in a particular locality, the process
of the Commonwealth and the lawful acts of its officers
resisted, and unlawful arrests made at the dictation of a
body of men who have assumed the functions of a government in that locality, and it is a state of war when a business plant has to be surrounded by the anny of the State
for weeks to protect it from unlawful violence at the hands
of men formerly employed."
Treason here consists in the "appointing of officers"
and "engagingin a common purpose to defy the law." The
defying the law in a certain manner, i e., by organization,
45
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is made the test, and not the purpose for which the law is
defied. Thus, A's robbery, or B's resistance to the law,
would not be treason, unless the robbers combined in sufficient force to require "the plant of companies to be surrounded by the armies of the State for weeks;" but, then,
though private gain be the motive, it is treason against the
State. Conducting an illicit distillery is not treason; but if
several persons engaged in the business combine to resist
arrest, their act becomes treason.
Now this idea of the main constituents of treason is
something very different from what Mr. Justice CHASE had
in his mind when he said in his charge at the trial of the
Northampton Insurgents: "You are to consider with what
intent the people assembled at Bethlehem,1 whether. for a
fiublic orfirivateburfiose."

It is not the treason of Mr. Justice GRIER, when he
said, speaking of the Christiana negroes, who had combined
to prevent the capture of one of their number: "Their
insurrection, their violence however great their number
may be, so long as it was to attain someiersonalorfirivate
end of their own, cannot be called levying war." The word
"combination" had no place in this jurist's definition of
treason, as he says: "A whole neighborhood of debtors may
conspire together to resist the sheriff and his officers. .
They may perpetrate their resistance by force; may kill the
officer and his assistants, and yet they will be liable only as
felons.
Nothing, indeed, could show more clearly the difference between the idea of treason heretofore existing, and
treason as defined by the Chief Justice of Pennsylvania,
than the following from the opinion of Judge CHASE: "The
true criterion to determine whether acts committed are
treason, or a less offense (as a riot), is the quo animo, or the
intention with which the people did assemble. Whether
the intention is universal or general, as to effect some
'Wh. State Trials, p. 635; U. S. v. Hanway, 2 Wall., Jr., 205.

2Ibid.
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object o

a generalPublic nature, it will be treason, and

cannot be considered, construed or reduced to a riot...
The iltention, with which any acts (as felonies, the disturbances of property or the like), were done, will show us to
what class of crimes the case belongs."'
With one jurist the criterion is the intention-a subjective fact; with the other, it is the objective fact of the
combination to defy the law.

Perhaps lawyers are not the best judges of the respective merits of what we may now call the Pennsylvania idea
of treason, (unless the majority of the Supreme Court of the
State are not satisfied with the criterion as laid down by Mr.
Chief Justice PAxsON), and of the criterion which has heretofore invariably governed the Courts of the United States.
We may be too apt to look at questions which touch
knotty social questions from a legal point of view solely.
But unquestionably from such a standpoint there has been
substituted for a clear cut criterion of treason-the private
or public object of the Act, the uncertain and shifting criterion of whether the resistance of the law was an o;ganzed resistance. The law of treason becomes, like the law
of negligence, always doubtful, because depending on the
particular circumstances of each case. What would be a
sufficient organization to amount to treason under some
circumstances, might not be sufficient under others. As
indictments for treason come usually after times of great
popular excitement, and when "several hundred thousand
dollars of the taxpayer's money has been expended in
maintaining order," it is to be feared that the "law of
treason" in its future development in the State of Pennsylvania, will depend, in no small degree, on the amount of
public indignation aroused by the resistance to lawful authority.
From what has been said we do not wish to be understood as criticising the officers of the State in bringing these
indictments for treason. ,If it can be proved by the State,
IWh.

State Trials, p. 364.
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as is alleged in the daily newspapers, that the Advisory
Committee of the Homestead rioters were at pains to declare to the world that their primary object was to show to
the citizens of the State and its government that an employer must deal with representatives of organized labor;
then, under either criterion, the members of the Board, together with everyone who directly or indirectly took part in
the riots, are guilty of treason against the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania, and should be both indicted and convicted.
In what we have said we simply wish to express regret at
the introductibn of a new criterion of treason.
OF THE NEXT ELECTORAL COLview of the nearness of the Presidential election'
it is of interest to learn that the proper number of electors
to which each State is entitled has been questioned. The
Constitution on this point says: "Each State shall appoint
in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a
number of electors equal to the whole number of Senators
and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in
Congress."' Apparently nothing could be more simple or
plain. And yet it so happens that the present Congress was
elected in i89o, and the number of Representatives sent by
each State depends on the Apportionment Act of February
25, 1882. The present Congress, however, has passed a
new Apportionment Act, based on the census of i89o.
The Congress to be elected on the 8th of next November
will contain more members than the present Congress.
The number now is three hundred and thirty one, with one
vacancy and four territorial delegates. The membership of
the Fifty-third Congress will be three hundred and fifty-six
Representatives and eighty-eight Senators. The Electoral
College, as based upon this apportionment, will be four
hundred and forty-four, while on the basis of the present
Congress it would be only four hundred and twenty. The
question presented by these facts, therefore, is by which
THE MEMIBERSHIP

LEGE.-In

1 Art. II, Sec. 1-2.
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Congress shall we determine the number of electors to
which any State is entitled-by that Congress which exists
to-day, or by that Congress which we elect on the day of
the election of the Presidential electors. The use of the
word " entitled" in the Constitution without any qualification as to whether the Congress actually in existence was
meant or not, was very unfortunate. In fact there is no
conclusive way of logically determining the matter. To
us, if the question could fairly be considered open, we
confess the expression "is entitled" would seem to indicate that a present, actually existing Congress at the time
the electors met was contemplated. Though even here
the reason, even if sound, is not conclusive as at the time
the mythical and now largely nonsensical college which
never meets, "meets," two Congresses may be said to be
in existence-the actual sitting and voting Congress and
the newly-elected Congress which comes into legal existence on the 4 th of Mclarch following. However, wvhere
the possible ambiguity is patent to all, and the only thing
of vital importance to the country is to have the matter
definitely settled, the interpretation put on this clause of
the Constitution, bv the men who had seen its adoption,
and in some instances had helped to make its provisions,
should be respected, especially where their interpretation
has been silently acquiesced in for one hundred years. On
March I, 1792, probably in view of a similar state of facts
to that in which we now find ourselves, Congress passed
the following Act: "The number of electors shall be equal
to the number of Senators and Representatives to which
the several States are by law entitled at the time when the
President and Vice-President to be chosen come into office;
except that where no apportionment of Representatives has
been made after any enumeration, at the time of choosing
electors, the number of electors shall be according to the
then existing apportionment."' The interpretation of the
provision is plain. The word "entitled," in the estimation
IRev. Stat.,

132.
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of the men who passed this Act, referred to the number of
Representatives which each State would have a right to
elect under the existing apportionment law, and, therefore,
not necessarily numerically the same as their actual representation in the Congress in existence at the time the election takes place or the Electoral College "meets."
This interpretation, while by no means as conclusive
as many of the daily papers have treated it-the Supreme
Court alone having the power to interpret the Constitution
-is nevertheless perfectly reasonable. There is nothing
which would lead us to say it was a prioriimpossible. As
a practical solution there is much to be said in its favor; and
happily there is little doubt but that both parties will
quietly acquiesce in it.
THE DEATH O

PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT.-

The time of a presidential election is perhaps as good a
one as any other to point out a duty of Congress, with
reference to the office of President, which that body has neglected ever since 1886. In case of the death of both the
President and the Vice-President, the law of January i,
1886, provides, that the different members of the Cabinet
in the usual order of presidence, shall temporarily fill the
office until their successor is elected. Previous to this Act,
the acting President of the Senate, and failing him the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, was to become
the acting President. The change was due to the manifest
unfairtiess of the possibility that under such an order of succession one of the opposite party of the deceased President
and Vice-President might become President, and to the evident danger of their being no acting President of the Senate, the Vice-President by hypothesis being dead, or that
the House should not as yet have organized and elected a
speaker. But under the old law there was provision for the
election in the usual way, within a reasonable time, of a
new President and Vice-President. The acting President
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House were only to
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act ad interim. This was evidentlyin accordance with
what we may almost call the direct mandate of the Constitution as expressed in the sixth paragraph of the first section of the Second Article: * * "C
and the Congress may

by law provide for the case of removal, death, etc., both of
the President and Vice-President, declaring what officer shall
then act aspresident, such officer shall then act accordingly,

until the disability be removed, or a President shall be
elected." The intention of the Constitution is shown not
only from the last words italicised, but from the fact that
Congress in its choice of an acting President is confined to an
officer of the government, designated by law. The law of
1886, however, repeals the sections of the Revised Statutes" 146-156 "-which provide for the election of another
"College," and as yet Congress has substituted nothing in
their place. A Cabinet officer, taking the position of President, would, therefore, continue to act as President until the
4 th of March following the next quadrennial election, unless
Congress provided for an election of his successor. This
it could not do without passing " a law," which like other
laws would have to receive the approval of the cabinet officer as acting President. In most instances this would be
like asking a man to sign his own death warrant. As the
law stands at present, therefore, in case of the death of both
President and Vice-President, the evident intention of the
Constitution, which was that the people should elect a college to select a new President for the unexpired term, would
be defeated, and a mere cabinet officer, an appointee of the
former President, might hold the highest office in the State
for nearly four years.
Of course there is no remedy for the defeat of the spirit
of the Constitution by the non-action of Congress. It is as
if Congress should fail to provide for the enumeration of the
people every ten years. There would be no help for it. A
people can tell their representatives what they shall not do,
but they cannot force them to pass a law, and still retain
their character as a deliberative assembly.

